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f AberdeenAnthropology is a philosophical inquiry into the conditions and possibilities of life in the one world we all inhabit. That this
world is indeed one is a core principle of the discipline. By exploring the relation between the particular life and life-as-a-whole,
I show how the latter can be understood as a correspondence in which lives are not added together but carry on alongside one
another. Life itself, then, is not the summation but the correspondence of its particulars. Comparing ideas of the self and the
soul, founded respectively in regimes of naturalism and animism, I show how correspondence proceeds through a process of
interstitial differentiation, in which agency is inside action rather than in front of it. This calls for a “turn” that is not ontological
but ontogenetic, leading us to conceive of the one world as neither a universe nor a fractiverse but as a pluriverse.
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Having received all mortal and immortal creatures and being therewithal replenished, this universe hath thus come into being,
living and visible, containing all things that are visible, the image of its maker, a god perceptible, most mighty and good, most
fair and perfect, even this one and only-begotten world that is.
—Plato, The Timaeus (Archer-Hind 1888, 345)The singular and the plural
Many years ago, I came up with my own deﬁnition of
anthropology. It was “philosophy with the people in”
(Ingold 1992: 696). By this I meant two things. Firstly,
the questions that anthropology asks are indeed philo-
sophical ones: they are questions about what it means
to be, to know, to think, imagine, perceive, act, remem-
ber, learn, live in the company of others, administer
justice, exercise power, relate to the environment, con-
front our own mortality, and so on and so forth. These
questions are endless. But secondly, the way anthropol-
ogy does its philosophizing is primarily through its en-
gagements—in both observation and conversation—
with the people among whom we work. Indeed, I would
now go further, to include not just the people but all the
other beings, of manifold kinds, with whom or which
we share our lives. There is here an implied criticism
of philosophical philosophers who would rather shy
away from any such engagement, preferring to labor
in the library with their canonical texts. We anthropol-
ogists, I contend, can do philosophy better, by virtue of
bringing into the conversation the voices, the experi-heory. Volume 8, number 1/2. DOI: http://dx.do
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not to mention legions of nonhumans—which would
otherwise be excluded. To do this kind of philosophy is,
in effect, to make a conversation of life itself.
This conversation—this life—is not, however, just
about the world. In an important sense which I shall
elaborate, it is the world. To join the conversation,
then, is to inhabit the world. That the inhabited world
is indeed one is, in my view, a core principle of our dis-
cipline. It is a principle that we neglect at our peril. I am
afraid that in practice, it has all too readily been ne-
glected, along with the challenges and responsibilities
it entails, in favor of a facile appeal to plurality. It some-
times seems that anthropologists are constitutionally
averse to oneness, to singularity, and likewise obsessed
with the plural. Never one world; always many worlds.
Once these were the many worlds of symbolic culture;
now, in the wake of the so-called “ontological turn,” we
have the many worlds of essential being, of realities to
be symbolized. Everyone and everything, it seems, is its
own world. You name it, and there’s a world for you.i.org/10.1086/698315
2-0019$10.00
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159 ONE WORLD ANTHROPOLOGYBut what do we mean by plurality? And in what sense is
it opposed to singularity? The question of how to recon-
cile the singular and the plural—or in slightly different
terms, the universal and the particular—could well
turn out to be the central problem of a truly philosoph-
ical anthropology.
Let me offer an example. People indigenous to the
HighArctic, mainly of northernmost Canada andGreen-
land, know themselves and are known as Inuit. The
word is a plural form, derived from the singular inuk,
which roughly translates as “soul.” In a modern idiom
we might suppose that every soul belongs to an individ-
ual, and therefore that the plural Inuit simply denotes a
population of individuals. Greenland and Canada, we
say, have their respective Inuit populations. We could
do a census and count them up. But for the people
themselves, at least traditionally, souls could not be
counted or enumerated in this way. As the ethnogra-
pher Henry Stewart has noted, the plural form is “most
certainly not a collective designation for all original
inhabitants of the tundra Arctic.” It rather connotes
something like “autonomous existence” (Stewart 2002:
90). Most often the plural sufﬁx (-miut) followed a top-
onym or place-marker—as, for example, Netsilik, plu-
ral Netsilingmiut, or Iglulik, plural Iglulingmiut—and
could be glossed as “soul-life going on in and around
this place.” The question this raises, then, is of how to
get from one to the other, from the life of the soul (inuk)
to soul-life (inuit). Not by multiplication: or not at least
in the arithmetic sense familiar to us from elementary
school. Nor, conversely, can you get from soul-life to
the life of the soul by division. Call the plural a multiplic-
ity if you must, but do not suppose it is a multiplication
of the singular!
Wholes and parts
The soul, after all, is not an entity sunk inexorably into
itself. That is to say, it is not an object, in the sense recently
promulgated by the advocates of so-called “object-
oriented ontology” (see, for example, Harman 2011). In
their view, everything you might care to name has its
own inscrutable essence, neither reducible to the more el-
ementary particles of which it and other entities might be
constituted, nor soluble into constructs at some superor-
dinate level of existence. Admittedly, the soul is amenable
neither to reduction nor to totalization; neither to “under-
mining” nor to “overmining,” as the object-oriented phi-
losophers would put it (Harman 2011: 172). But this does
not make the soul an object-in-itself. It is, more funda-This content downloaded from 139.1
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms mentally, amovement, which takes the grammatical form
not of the noun or pronoun, but of the verb. And themost
outstanding characteristic of this movement is that it car-
ries on, or keeps on going. For Inuit people, it even carries
on over generations, as a grandchild, for example, is an-
imated by the soul of its grandparent, leading parents
to address their children, sometimes, as they would ad-
dress their own parents, and to treat themwith equivalent
deference and respect (Nuttall 1994). The idea of “early
years,” as though children were closer to some imaginary
point of origin in a process of socialization, therefore
makes no sense. Everyone, at any moment, is both older
and younger than themselves.
Thus souls—or lives—are movements, and to echo
the celebrated aphorism of Heraclitus, one cannot step
twice into the life of the same soul. What, then, is the
relation between the life of the soul and soul-life, or to
put it in more general terms, between the particular life
and life itself ? Is it a relation of part to whole? Yes, so
long as we don’t make the common mistake of confus-
ing wholeness with totalization (Ingold 2007: 209). To-
tality, to my ear at least, implies addition and comple-
tion: whether or not you consider the result to be more
than, equal to, or even less than the sum of its parts,
the logic of summation remains. “Life as a whole,” how-
ever, cannot be reached by any procedure of summa-
tion, whether additive or multiplicative. It is never com-
plete, nor is it even on the way to completion, since it
advances to no end save its own continuation. As the
generative potential of a world in becoming, life is al-
ways going on, a perpetual origination. Or as one elder
from among the Wemindji Cree of northern Canada
told the ethnographer Colin Scott, life is “continuous
birth” (Scott 1989: 195).
Particular lives, too, can be parts of life-as-a-whole—
the life of the soul a part of soul-life—but only so long as
we think of these parts, likewise, as ways of carrying on,
like the lines of a composition. The idea of composition,
according to philosopher Bruno Latour (2010: 473–4),
“underlines that things have to be put together (Latin
componere) while retaining their heterogeneity.” Thus,
parts remain differentiable within the whole; they do
not merge into one homogeneous current of vitality.
In all other respects, however, the sense in which I speak
of composition is entirely contrary to Latour’s. For him
it is a medley of bits and pieces, “utterly heterogeneous,”
which can at best make up a composite material that
is “fragile, revisable and diverse.” Such a composite can
be as readily decomposed as composed (Latour 2010:
474). The analogy I have in mind, by contrast, is that33.007.099 on June 21, 2018 04:54:26 AM
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Tim INGOLD 160of polyphonic music, in which every voice, or every in-
strument, carries on along its own melodic line. In music
the relation between parts and whole is not summative—
neither additive nor multiplicative—but contrapuntal.
Think of the tenor part in the chorus or the cello part
in the symphony. I want to think of the life of every
particular soul, likewise, as a line of counterpoint that,
even as it issues forth, is continually attentive and re-
sponsive to each and every other. Souls, we might say,
are answerable to one another, a condition that carries
entailments of both responsiveness and responsibility
(Wentzer 2014).
Assemblage and correspondence
Precisely because souls go along together and because
their continual regeneration is nourished and impelled
by the memory of their association, soul-life is a whole
that cannot be decomposed without causing grief if not
destruction to the lives of its parts. This is why I am dis-
inclined to think of the composition as an assembly,
or “assemblage” as it is ubiquitously rendered through
awkward translation from the French. The source for
this translation commonly turns out to lie in the sprawl-
ing meditations of philosopher Gilles Deleuze and his
collaborator, psychoanalyst Félix Guattari, in A thou-
sand plateaus (Mille plateaux), of which more below.
The difﬁculties of translating this work are indeed for-
midable, and it is true that some of the plethora of senses
that have clustered around “assemblage,” as something
like a gathering or bundling of life-lines reminiscent of
sheaves of corn at harvest, do approximate to what I have
inmind (Ingold 1993: 168). But othersmost deﬁnitely do
not. An example is philosopher Manuel De Landa’s ap-
propriation of the term to denote a transitory and con-
tingent coming together of heterogeneous components
that cohere only through an exterior contact or adhesion
that leaves their inner natures more or less unaffected,
and that can therefore be detached and reconﬁgured in
other arrangements without loss (DeLanda 2006: 18).
This, to my mind, is precisely how not to describe the
way that particular lives play into life itself. The trouble
is that by resorting to the notion of assemblage as a
catch-all, it is all too easy to obscure or gloss over a dis-
tinction that I consider to be of capital importance.
This is the distinction between the kinds of work
done in language with the little words “and” and “with.”
The logic of the conjunction is articulatory; that of the
preposition differential. Contrasting the ﬁgures of the
tree and the rhizome, Deleuze and Guattari allow themThis content downloaded from 139.1
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms to stand, respectively, for ﬁliation and alliance. The
Deleuzoguattarian multiplicity is unashamedly rhizo-
matic rather than dendritic. And the rhizome, they say,
is nothing but alliance. “The tree imposes the verb ‘to
be’, but the fabric of the rhizome is the conjunction,
‘and . . . and . . . and . . .’” (Deleuze and Guattari 2004:
27). With respect, this is grossly unfair to living trees
which, unlike their diagrammatic counterparts, grow,
branch, and swerve fromwithin themidst of things every
bit asmuch as do the tangling roots of the rhizome. In the
sphere of human relations, though ﬁliation might be
marked on the anthropologist’s genealogical chart as a
line connecting two points, standing respectively for par-
ent and child, in real life it is a process of becoming in
the course of which, through “growing older together”
(Schutz 1962: 17), the child carries on the life of its parent
while progressively differentiating its own life from that
which it engendered it. Filiation is not the connection
of parent and child, it the life of parent with child (Fig-
ure 1). Just as inmusical counterpoint, parts are not com-
ponents that are added to one another but movements
that carry on alongside one another, so too, in the human
family, lives lived in counterpoint are not “and . . . and . . .
and” but “with . . . with . . . with.”And in answering—or
responding—to one another, they co-respond. Thus,
in place of the assemblage as a way of talking about the
multiplicity of soul-life, as if it were an alliance of souls,
I propose the term correspondence to connote their afﬁl-
iation. “Life as a whole,” then, is not the articulatory sum-
mation but the differential correspondence of its partic-
ulars (Ingold 2015: 23).
It follows that the relations that make up the whole
are not between but along. Between-ness gives us the
idea of interaction, a reciprocal back-and-forth ex-
change between subject positions. The along-ness of cor-
respondence, by contrast, does not go back and forth
but side by side, like companions walking together or
playing music together. And the thing about walking
and playing is that they do not issue from a position
but continually pull the performer out of it. Both, as
the philosopher of education Jan Masschelein puts it,
are practices of exposure (Masschelein 2010: 278). The
English language has a beautiful word, longing, to de-
scribe the exposure of going along. In longing, an imag-
ination that lies beyond the horizon of conceptualization
loops proleptically back to meet an origination that lies
beyond the reach of memory, as in the cycling soul-life
of the Inuit, in a place where past and future merge. It is
a place we perpetually dream of and strive for, but never
reach.33.007.099 on June 21, 2018 04:54:26 AM
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161 ONE WORLD ANTHROPOLOGYIn a workshop held at the University of Aberdeen,
some three years ago, the mathematician Ricardo Ne-
mirovsky gave us a wonderful demonstration of what
this means in practice. In a nearby park, we laid out
a rope in the exact form of a parabola, its ends diverg-
ing to inﬁnity—or rather to where our rope ran out.
We then viewed the parabola through a vertical sheet
of Perspex and drew the line of the rope on the perspex
with a felt pen. We found that we had drawn an ellipse.
At inﬁnity, the ends of the parabola had closed up. In
its very open-endedness, the whole, it seems, is spatio-
temporally self-encompassing: we live on the inside of
eternity, as Australian Aboriginal people have long been
trying to tell us with their ontology of the Dreaming or
“everywhen” (Stanner 1965). With this demonstration
in mind, let me return to the problem of universality.
What can it mean to say of the one world that it is uni-
versal? And how does it relate to the particular, or to the
relativity of the particular moment, the particular life,
the way of the soul?
Differentiation and diversity
It means that we have to think of difference in terms of
differentiation rather than diversity. The distinction isThis content downloaded from 139.1
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms critical. One way to get at it is to reﬂect upon the mean-
ing of the ground. How often have we heard it said that
cultural particulars are superimposed upon the ground
of universal human nature? Well then, what is the
ground? Is it—as the founder of ecological psychol-
ogy, James Gibson (1979), once put it—an underlying
surface of support upon which all else rests? Or is it
rather—to follow the thinking of Tadashi Suzuki (1986),
one of the foremost ﬁgures of contemporary Japanese
theatre—a source of growth and nourishment?
For Gibson, the ground is but a platform, affording
nothing to its inhabitants save that it is “stand-on-able”
(Gibson 1979: 127). To be habitable, any environment
must be furnished with objects, much as an interior
room must be furnished if the householder is to do
more than stand in it. As chairs, tables and cupboards
are set upon the ﬂoor of the room, Gibson explains, so
hills, trees, and boulders are set upon the ground. As
such, the ground appears as a plane of indifference, a
tabula rasa, from which all variations have been ex-
cised, only to be re-imposed, as diverse, free-standing
entities, upon it. For Suzuki, quite to the contrary, the
ground is the very source of emergent difference. It
gives rise to the features we see, the formations of the
landscape, trees and buildings, even people. The ﬂoor-Figure 1: Filiation. Left: The connection of parent and child, as it might be drawn on a genealogical chart. Right: The life of
parent with child, as a “growing older” together.33.007.099 on June 21, 2018 04:54:26 AM
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Tim INGOLD 162boards of the traditional Japanese house, Suzuki (1986:
21) tells us, virtually grow into the inhabitants who
walk them, just as did the trees from which the boards
were made once grow from the earth. Here, the ground
is no more indifferent to the trees than are ﬂoorboards
to people; rather, trees and people arise from the earth
and from boards, respectively, in an ongoing process of
differentiation (Figure 2).
The distinction I want to emphasize here is between
the ground of indifference and the ground of differenti-
ation, or—if you will—between the respective grounds
of being and becoming. Being different, that is diver-
sity; becoming different, that is differentiation. Differen-
tiation turns to diversity by way of the twin operations
of excision and reimposition: where the former cuts
things out from the processes of their generation, the
latter deposits them, as ready formed particulars, upon
the universal ground of indifference. This ground, as we
are inclined to say, is hard, providing a solid but inert
foundation for the objects that rest upon it, and the ac-
tivities that are conducted across its surface. It is worth
noting that exactly the same metaphor is imported into
our thinking about the human mind, when neuropsy-
chologists, for example, speak of the mind’s “hardware”
as offering a neural substrate capable of supporting var-This content downloaded from 139.1
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms ious kinds of cognitive operations, including those in-
volved in speech and manual tool-use. In the very divi-
sion between the hardware and the software it supports,
the separation of knowing from being, of sapiens from
Homo, is replicated and reinforced. What would hap-
pen, then, if to the contrary, we were to think of the
ground of human perception and cognition, or of sen-
tience and sensibility, as something more like the ﬂoor-
boards of a traditional Japanese house, or, with Deleuze
and Guattari (2004: 17), like a ﬁeld of long grass, or even
like the earth itself?
To think of difference in terms of differentiation
rather than diversity is to imagine the universal not as
a featureless ground upon which all variation is depos-
ited but as a surface that is as folded and crumpled as the
earth beneath our feet. With the logic of diversity, of ex-
cision and reimposition, all difference is bilateral: as
features are distinguished from the ground, by way of
their excision, so the ground is distinguished from the
features that are then reimposed upon it. But as Deleuze
sets out to show in his book onDifference and repetition
(1994), in becoming different, one thingmay distinguish
itself from anotherwithout the latter’s distinguishing it-
self from the former. Imagine lifting a sheet to form a
crease; we register the line of the crease, we see it asFigure 2: Figure and ground. Left: The ﬁgure is mounted on the ground of indifference. Right: The ﬁgure arises as a fold in the
ground itself.33.007.099 on June 21, 2018 04:54:26 AM
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crease is still in the sheet. It is not as though the sheet
had parted company with the crease and sunk back into
ﬂat homogeneity, leaving the crease-line, as it were,
high and dry (Ingold 2015: 34–5). So it is, too, with lines
and the ground: the line, says Deleuze, distinguishes it-
self from the ground “without the ground distinguish-
ing itself from the line” (Deleuze 1994: 29). The distinc-
tion, in short, is unilateral. Every distinguishing feature,
then, is a fold in the ground (Figure 2).
My contention is that in a life of longing, all differ-
ence arises thus, from within, in the midst of things. It
is, in that sense, interstitial. It follows that the life of the
soul is to soul-life as the crease is to the sheet, or as the
line is to the ground. As the crease distinguishes itself
from the sheet or the line from the ground, so the par-
ticularity of the singular life distinguishes itself from
the universality of life itself, without the universal’s dis-
tinguishing itself from the particular. That is why I call
the life process one of interstitial differentiation rather
than of exterior articulation. As articulation is to differ-
entiation, so is alliance to ﬁliation, and assemblage to
correspondence. Perhaps you might compare the dis-
tinction to that between cutting timber transversally
with a saw and splitting it longitudinally with an axe.This content downloaded from 139.1
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms The saw cuts the length into blocks or sections, which
can only be reassembled through conjunction. But the
axe joins with the timber, as in its swerve it corresponds
with lines of growth that were incorporated into the
wood when it was part of a living tree. The axe acts
on the timber as the preposition on the noun, following
the grain of the world’s becoming and differentiating it
from within (Figure 3).
The self and the soul
Now to us anthropologists, the ontology that gives us
the ground of nature as a universal and homogeneous
substrate upon which are set the fragmentary forms of
cultural diversity will be immediately recognizable as
the default position adopted by generations of text-
books—a position that tends to be glossed by such non-
speciﬁc words as “western” and “modern.” Philippe De-
scola, in his treatise Beyond nature and culture (2013),
calls it “naturalism.” For Descola, naturalism is one of
four logically possible ontological schemas that under-
write the way human beings can organize their relations
with one another and with the world they inhabit, and
render this world intelligible. The others are analogism,
totemism, and animism. This is not the place for anFigure 3: Transverse and longitudinal cut. Above: A log sawn against the grain into sections. Below: The same log split along
the grain with an axe.33.007.099 on June 21, 2018 04:54:26 AM
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Tim INGOLD 164extended review of Descola’s arguments (see Ingold
2016). But I would like to attend brieﬂy to his account
of animism, since by doing so I can both add some pre-
cision to what I mean by the relation between the life of
the soul and soul-life, and clarify the sense of “one-
world-ness” that follows from it.
There is one characteristic of animism, Descola as-
sures us, that “everyone can accept,” and this is the “at-
tribution by humans to non-humans of an interiority
identical to their own” (Descola 2013: 129). By this
he means that plants and (especially) animals are taken
to be endowed with souls which enable them to act,
normatively and ethically, as social beings, just as hu-
mans do. Against this homogeneous sea of souls, com-
mon to all animate beings, there stands the diversity of
exterior physical bodies that gives each particular soul
its executive armature and allows it to function in the
world in the particular way it does. In this regard,
Descola thinks, animism is the perfect inverse of mod-
ern or western naturalism, which gives us the diversity
of forms of mental or spiritual life (or what modern
people call “cultures”) set against the background of a
homogeneous, physical nature. Or in a nutshell, whereas
animism is the combination of similarity of interiori-
ties and dissimilarity of physicalities, naturalism is the
combination of similarity of physicalities and dissimi-
larity of interiorities.
Now this all sounds very neat, until you start to
wonder why naturalism, in the same breath that it ex-
tols the universality of nature, vis-à-vis the diversity of
cultures, also celebrates the boundless diversity of liv-
ing kinds or species vis-à-vis the universality of the hu-
man mind and of its conscious sense of self. What is
similar, and what is diverse, depends on which way
you look! And if naturalism can just as well be deﬁned
by the dissimilarity of physicalities and similarity of in-
teriorities as by its opposite, then how can it any longer
be distinguished from animism? The answer, I think, is
that compared with the similarities and dissimilarities
of animism, those of naturalism are of another kind.
In brief: naturalism’s similarities are of identity, ani-
mism’s are of continuity; naturalism’s differences are
of diversity, animism’s are of differentiation. To amplify
these twin distinctions, we can bring an earlier master-
piece of comparative anthropology, Roy Wagner’s The
invention of culture (1975), to our aid.
While for Descola, naturalism and animism are but
two of four possible ontological schemas, Wagner of-
fers only two possibilities. On the one hand are people
who deliberately assemble life into collectivities, and inThis content downloaded from 139.1
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms so doing precipitate an idea of the world as made up of
primordially discrete, enumerable entities, otherwise
known as individuals. On the other hand are people
for whom the task is to differentiate life into separable
streams, precipitating as they do so an idea of the world
as primordially undifferentiated (Wagner 1975: 51).
For Wagner these alternatives are exempliﬁed respec-
tively by “middle-class Americans” and the Daribi peo-
ple of Papua New Guinea among whom he carried out
his ﬁeldwork: the former broadly representative of
western modernity, the latter of “tribal peoples.” Let us,
for the sake of argument, gloss over the obvious prob-
lems with the terms of comparison, and allow the ﬁrst
to equate broadly to Descola’s “naturalism,” and the sec-
ond to his “animism.” What interests me here is not
where Wagner draws his lines between the West and
the rest, but what he has to say about the self and the
soul under the two contrasting ontological regimes
(1975: 93–4).
Under the ﬁrst regime, of naturalism, similarity
means identity. We imagine a world of individuals.
These individuals can be counted. They can be aggre-
gated into the kinds of collectivities we call “societies.”
And they can be compared according to their intrinsic
attributes. An attribute is deemed to be universal when
it is common to every entity; it is particular when it is
limited to a narrower class of entities, or perhaps even
unique to a single entity. Thus, we might claim that ev-
ery individual human being possesses a sense of self, a
singular seat of reason and conscience, and that this
sense is therefore universal. But we might also claim
that the mode of expression of this sense varies between
one group of human beings and another, and class all
those who express their selfhood in a certain way as
members of one culture, and all those who express it
in a different way as members of another. We would,
in so doing, establish what we take to be the “fact” of
cultural diversity, although—as Wagner shows—this
“fact” is really just the precipitate of a logical procedure.
Under the second regime, of animism, we start not
with populations of more or less identical individuals
but with a continuum of yet-to-be differentiated rela-
tions. Out of this continuum, recognizable beings have
to be formed. It is the task of life to do so. Yet in this pro-
cess of formation, which carries on throughout life and is
never complete, there always remains a memory of that
undifferentiated potential from the interstices of which
every being is drawn. Thismemory is the soul. In a sense,
the soul is a constant reminder of the viscosity of the re-
lational ﬁeld, and of the effort that has to be put in to33.007.099 on June 21, 2018 04:54:26 AM
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165 ONE WORLD ANTHROPOLOGYwork against it. It is the reﬂex of life-as-a-whole that is
coiled up into each part—into each particular life—in
the course of that very differentiation by which the parts
emerge from the whole. In this regard, the soul is the pre-
cise obverse of the self. Under a regime of naturalism, the
selfmay be disciplined in the work of creating a collectiv-
ity, it may be forced to conform to common standards,
and yet its very persistence attests to the threat of decom-
position, reminding us that without continued effort, the
whole is liable to collapse into its individual constituents.
Under a regime of animism, by contrast, the soul cannot
be disciplined, but it can be lost, drowned in the very
ocean from which it was once generated (Wagner 1975:
98). Whereas the self casts its shadow on the inner walls
of society, life-as-a-whole carries the soul in themidst of
its involute folds.
Into the vortex
“Life in general,”wrote the philosopherHenri Bergson in
his Creative evolution (1911), “is mobility itself; particu-
lar manifestations of life accept this mobility reluctantly,
and constantly lag behind” (1911: 128). Bergson pictured
the particular life, thus, as a kind of eddy or whirlwind, a
circulation, brought on by a swerve or deﬂection in the
current of life itself that would otherwise proceed relent-
lessly on its rectilinear course. Life itself is an evolution;
the cycle of every particular life is a revolution. The ﬁrst,
though it may be continuous with the second, “cannot
continue in it without being drawn aside from its direc-
tion” (Bergson 1911: 129). There ismuch in common be-
tween Bergson’s vitalism and the animism, described
above, which casts the particular life as the life of the soul,
and life itself as soul-life. We can, I think, take the one as
a guide to the other. And in doing so we can see that in
the world according to animism, things are never ready
formed—never fully precipitated from the matrix of
their generation—but ever-forming, as concentrations
of vital materials and energies that are, and must remain,
perpetually in circulation. Everything that is—or better,
everything that occurs—is immersed in the ﬂow.
Thus, it is all very well to speak, with Descola, of the
interiority of soul-life, but this is not, as he would have
it, an interiority set over and against the exteriority of
bodies. It is rather the interiority of life that is immanent
in the world itself, and that participates directly in its re-
lations and processes. Let us follow Deleuze (2001) in
calling this the interiority of immanence. Quite contrary
to the interiority that is opposed to the physicality of the
exterior world, the interiority of immanence runs seam-This content downloaded from 139.1
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms lessly into physicality, like the singular surface of a Mö-
bius strip, without any breach of continuity. Recall
Bergson’s comparison of the life cycle to the eddy in a
stream. Can you tell what is inside the eddy from what
is outside? Of course not, for the eddy is not a container
and it has no content. It is a vortex, the form of turbu-
lence. As Bergson observed, though the life-form, like
the eddy, might appear to us as a stable thing, with an in-
side and an outside, the appearance is deceptive, for in
truth “the very permanence of . . . form is only the outline
of a movement” (1911: 128). Every particular soul, like-
wise, is but an eddy in the ﬂow of soul-life, a vortex that
continually winds and unwinds. It is a place not of rest
but of tumult. Only at the eye of the vortex does stillness
reign. Here’s the philosopher Michel Serres, in The birth
of physics (2000), baring his own soul: “I ammyself a de-
viation, and my soul declines, my global body is open,
adrift. It slips, irreversibly, on the slope. Who am I? A
vortex” (Serres 2000: 37).
But if the differences of animism, manifesting on the
plane of immanence, arise thus as singular vortices in the
current, those of naturalism have broken off from it and
lie strewn upon that plane of indifference otherwise
known as “nature.” The former are emergent and inter-
stitial; the latter resultant and superﬁcial. Whereas ani-
mism, then, gives us a world of becoming, naturalism
gives us a world of being. And it is the logic of naturalism,
operating from behind the scenes in Descola’s account,
which contrives to wrap every cycle of life into itself, thus
converting the generative currents of its formation into a
vital agent that is supposed to inhabit an interior divided
off from the exterior world of its interactions with others
(Figure 4). In my call for a one-world anthropology, I
want to escape the deadening impact of this logic, to re-
lease the soul from its imagined incarceration and to re-
store its turbulence to the circulations of life. It is to ap-
peal not to the naturalistic dyad of identity and diversity
but to the animistic pairing of continuity and differenti-
ation. The universal, then, is not a lowest common de-
nominator but a ﬁeld of continuous variation; not a
plane of indifference upon which diversity is overlain,
but a plane of immanence from which difference is ever-
emergent.
Agency and patiency
The next stage in my argument is to relate the principle
of interstitial differentiation to the problem of agency. I
want to suggest that there is a connection between the
question of how to reconcile the singular and the plu-33.007.099 on June 21, 2018 04:54:26 AM
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tion of how to relate agency and patiency, action and
suffering. Indeed, the connection is so intrinsic that
these seem to me to be alternative ways of posing what
is fundamentally the same problem. The life of the soul
is made up of doings; soul-life, by contrast, is what a
living being undergoes. So, our question is really about
the relation between doing and undergoing. Now in the
grammar of most modern Indo-European languages,
there is a distinction between the active and passive
voices of the verb: the active voice is for what one does;
the passive for what one undergoes. Should we, then,
think of life in the active voice or in the passive? Or
should we think in terms of some kind of interplay be-
tween the two? More precisely, should the active be
framed within the passive or vice versa? Are the things
we do the callings of a life that happens to us, or are the
things that happen to us called up by the things we do?
For those of us raised in an Indo-European linguis-
tic environment, our usual habits of thought—condi-
tioned as they are (though by no means determined)
by the grammatical categories of the languages we
speak—put the agency of the individual out in front,This content downloaded from 139.1
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms as the sovereign initiator of his or her actions, that is
as a self. And this self stands opposed to the exterior
environments of nature and society in which its actions
have effects. Thus, we tend to set the agency of the par-
ticular life against the passive backdrop of life in general.
The principle of interstitial differentiation, however,
suggests that the doings of every particular life continu-
ally emerge and distinguish themselves from within the
plane of immanence that is life itself. This is to frame do-
ing within undergoing, and not the other way around.
And it is to think of every doing not as self-initiated ac-
tion but as a moment in the life of the soul. Such doings
belong not to us directly or exclusively, but to the mem-
ory of the whole coiled up within us. Another way of
putting this is to think of everything we do as a task.
For the task is something that falls to us, as responsive
and responsible beings, as part of the life we undergo.
To revert to an earlier distinction, it is a way of corre-
sponding with the world in which we live, rather than
of interacting with it.
If every doing is a task, then we need to ﬁnd a way of
talking about agency that puts it inside undergoing.
With our conventional dichotomy between active andFigure 4: Wrapping the soul. Left: Souls emerge as vortices in the current of life. Right: They appear contained and interact
only by way of their exterior bodies.33.007.099 on June 21, 2018 04:54:26 AM
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However, many non-European languages (as well as
Indo-European in earlier times, such as in classical
Greek) recognized what linguists call the middle voice
of the verb. In the middle voice, agency is inside the ac-
tion, inside the verb. As the linguist Émile Benveniste
put it, in a classic paper, in the middle voice the doer
“achieves something that is being achieved in him”
(1971: 149). My suggestion, then, is that in the one world
of becoming, life is lived neither in the active nor in the
passive but in the middle voice. Such is the life of the
soul. Its particular life is not played out against the back-
ground of life itself but emerges actively from its midst.
With life lived in the middle voice, our focus can no lon-
ger be on the essence of being. It is must rather be on its
ongoing generation. That is to say, it should be not on
ontology but on ontogeny.
This idea of ontogenesis (as ontogénèse, the “becom-
ing of being”) was key to the philosophy of Gilbert
Simondon, for whom it equated more or less to the
process he otherwise called individuation, that is, the
continual “falling out” of being from becoming. “It cor-
responds,” Simondon wrote, “to a capacity beings pos-
sess of falling out of step with themselves, of resolving
themselves by the very act of falling out of step” (Si-
mondon 1993: 300). There are echoes, here, of Bergson’s
idea that life “lags behind” in the deﬂections and circu-
lations of its particular forms; that where life in general
forges ahead, its cycles “want to mark time” (Bergson
1911: 128). In the process of individuation, we could
say, the soul arises as a transient falling out-of-step, “a
metastable being, which carries within itself the pre-
individual forces from which it was produced” (Grosz
2012: 41). As a kink, fold, or vortex in the ﬂow of life,
the soul nevertheless contains within itself, as a memory
of the forces that produced it, the potential for further
transformation. In Simondon’s terms, life itself (or
soul-life) is a never-ending process of individuation,
but critically, the differentiations it engenders are con-
centrated not at some putative boundary with an outside
world, but in its internal resonances (Simondon 1993:
305). Or in other words, life as individuation—as lived
in the middle voice—is a process of interstitial differen-
tiation.
An ontogenetic turn?
I do not like the idea of “turns”; they are, for the most
part, exhibitions of academic vanity. But if we mustThis content downloaded from 139.1
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ing, then let us follow Simondon in calling for a turn
that is not ontological but ontogenetic. Let our concern
be not with philosophies but with generations of being.
With multiple ontologies, everything or every being is
its ownworld, closed in and complete, so that ultimately
there are as many worlds as there are beings or things.
Each has collapsed into itself, ultimately impenetrable
to others. This is the reductio ad absurdum of object-
oriented ontology. But with multiple ontogenies, every
being or thing is open, subject to growth and move-
ment, issuing forth along its own particular path within
a world of nevertheless unlimited differentiation. Noth-
ing in this world is settled, once and for all. In short, on-
togenesis allows us to reconcile singularity and multi-
plicity, agency and patiency, within one world.
“There is only one world,” declares the philosopher
Alain Badiou, but it is a world that refuses any nor-
mative preconditions for existing in it—such as might
be entailed in any naturalistic deﬁnition of universal
humanity (Badiou 2008: 38; see Trott 2011: 87). How
many times have we attempted to deﬁne human nature
in terms of the common possession of this or that attri-
bute—bipedalism, tool-making, pair-bonding, language,
symbolic thought, and so on—only to discover that
there are creatures born of man and woman who lack
these attributes and who consequently ﬁnd themselves
excluded, or at least considered less-than-human? The
one world we inhabit is not, however, reserved for what
anthropologist Donald Brown (1991) has called “Uni-
versal People,” creatures of the normative imagination
delineated by a suite of innate capacities and behavioral
traits that all are supposed to share. It is rather a world
of ever-emergent difference, which admits no bound-
aries of inclusion or exclusion.
In this world of becoming, as I have observed else-
where, though each of us may be different, these differ-
ences are constituted in and through the generative
processes of life; they do not exist in spite of it. To point
to similarities, by contrast, is to imagine a world al-
ready fragmented into its minimal constituents. “In
short, it is difference that connects, whereas similarity
divides” (Ingold 1996: 6). Political theorist William
Connolly makes much the same point, insisting that
“there is no identity without difference.” To pit the
“universal” against “difference,” Connolly writes, “re-
duces the essentially relational character of difference
to the bland idea of diversity among independent enti-
ties” (Connolly 1995: xx, original emphasis). It is, as we33.007.099 on June 21, 2018 04:54:26 AM
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coming to the diversity of being. To undo this reduc-
tion, we must put difference and the universal back to-
gether again. This is what Badiou does. “The single
world,” he argues, “is precisely the place where an un-
limited set of differences exist . . . far from casting
doubt on the unity of the world, these differences are
its principle of existence” (Badiou 2008: 39). I believe
that anthropology should be ﬁghting, intellectually
and politically, for the recognition of this kind of world.
So what should we call it?
In 1908, the American philosopher William James
delivered the Hibbert Lectures at the University of Ox-
ford, published in the following year under the title A
pluralistic universe. James’s proposed solution to the
problem of the one and the many was to insist that
the “multiverse,” as he called it, is simultaneously both
singular and plural for the reason that its one-ness
is never absolutely complete. It is “strung-along,” said
James, “not rounded in and closed” (James [1909] 2012:
170). Regardless of the part or element on which you
might choose to focus, at whatever level of exclusiveness
of inclusiveness, there is always an overﬂow of relations.
Wherever you are, there are further connections to be
drawn, maybe direct, maybe through intermediaries.
And in the drawing of these connections, even in their
interpenetration, things lose nothing of their particu-
larity.
Should we follow James and call our one world a
multiverse or pluriverse, rather than a universe? Well,
yes and no. We may agree with the geographer and
environmental philosopher Augustin Berque, that the
idea of the universe in its modern, naturalistic sense—
as an objective exteriority that can be grasped only
by the interior mind of the transcendental subject—“ne-
gates all possibility of a world . . . that is both supremely
qualitative and totally unitary,” that is, the kind of
world posited by Plato in the ﬁnal lines of the Timaeus
with which I began this essay (Berque 2013: 51). Yet I
would still want to enter one qualiﬁcation, which goes
back to my comparison of the conjunction and the
preposition as ways of joining. The Jamesian pluralis-
tic universe is multiply connected, yet its connections
are conjunctive, not prepositional. They join things
externally, on the outside. “Pragmatically interpreted,”
wrote James, “pluralism or the doctrine that it is many
means only that the sundry parts of reality may be ex-
ternally related. Everything you can think of, however
vast or inclusive, has on the pluralistic view a genuinely
‘external’ environment of some sort or amount.” ThisThis content downloaded from 139.1
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is rhizomatic in every way: it is “and . . . and . . .
and”; the very model of an assemblage. Yet the passage
that immediately follows is more equivocal. “Things are
‘with’ one another in many ways,” James goes on, “but
nothing includes everything, or dominates over every-
thing. The word ‘and’ trails along after every sentence.
Something always escapes” (James [1909] 2012: 167).
Notice how in this passage, James starts with “with”
and only then resorts to “and.” Perhaps he would have
liked it both ways.
Universe, fractiverse, pluriverse
This dilemma has not gone away, nor has the question
it raises. Is our world a patchwork of multiple realities,
irregularly stitched across their rough, unmatched, and
sometimes overlapping edges? Or is it more like a
braid: a thing of entwined and ever-extending path-
ways, binding longitudinally rather than transversally
along their lines of growth and movement? Writing
from his perspective as a student of science and tech-
nology, John Law (2011) has recently presented an an-
swer of the ﬁrst kind. His concern is to offer an alter-
native to the idea that everything there is can be
made to ﬁt into a single container universe, or what
he calls the “one-world world” (Law 2011: 10). In such
a world, anything that cannot be made to ﬁt—anything
that ﬂies in the face of universal reality—is simply dis-
missed as an instance of belief, and mistaken belief at
that. In a world divided between colonized and coloniz-
ers, what the former take for truth is classed by the lat-
ter as mere belief, though as Law shows, the same logic
has long been at work in the societies of the colonizers
as well. But it is a logic that fails in a post-colonial era,
in which different and incommensurable realities grind
against one another with no assurance of reconciliation
or containment. We now live, says Law, in the era of
the fractiverse, “a set of contingent, enacted and more
or less intersecting worlds in the plural” (2011: 2).
Worlds in the plural? We seem to be back where we
started, with the many as opposed to the one. Perhaps
this is because of Law’s focus on the being of things
rather than their becoming, on ontologies rather than
ontogenies. The realities, multiple as they are, seem
in Law’s account to have already fallen out from the
matrices of their generation. To recover the one-ness
of the world, should we not move upstream, and corre-
spond with things in the moment of their appearing,
rather than assembling what has already appeared on33.007.099 on June 21, 2018 04:54:26 AM
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seek an answer of the second kind. Returning to the
philosophy of James, but in the context of contemporary
geopolitics, anthropologist Arturo Escobar (2011) hints
at just such an answer. For Escobar the one-world world
is the globe of corporate capitalism. Epitomized in the
celebrated logo of the World Bank—with its perfect
gridlocked sphere shorn of life, elements, and people—
this is indeed a world that is “rounded in and closed,”
as James would have put it, and in which everything
there is has been reduced to liquid commensurability.
It is a world of commodities and monetary values, from
which people are overwhelmingly marginalized if not ac-
tually locked out (Badiou 2008: 38).
Against this global world, and with acknowledgment
to James, Escobar reintroduces what he calls the
pluriverse. “It might be described,” he writes, “as a pro-
cess of planetarization articulated around a vision of the
Earth as a living whole that is always emerging out of
the manifold biophysical, human, and spiritual elements
and relations that make it up” (Escobar 2011: 139). Un-
like Law’s fractiverse, Escobar’s pluriverse is unambigu-
ously “with . . . with . . . with.” It is prepositional, not
conjunctive, and its plurality arises not from chains of
exterior connection—of things strung along—but from
the cascades of individuation or interstitial differentia-
tion by which the “Earth as a living whole”—to borrow
Escobar’s words—is continually emerging. It is to the
one-worldness of this whole, I believe, that anthropol-
ogy must remain committed.
Yet for this very reason, I have my doubts about the
propensity of anthropological scholarship always to
want to put other lives within their social, cultural,
and historical contexts. This is like laying them to rest,
putting them to bed, so that we need no longer engage
with them directly. Embedding lives in context implies
an already completed conversation. It is as though they
are no longer enjoined in the world we inhabit but
rather set aside as the objects of our concern. They be-
long to other worlds, not to ours. If we are to return
these lives to our one world, then we must recall them
from the contexts in which our scholarship has buried
them, and bring them back into presence. We will then
discover that what we had closed off embraces all we
should acknowledge.
As I stated at the outset, the world is a conversation; it
is not the object of our conversation. In this conversation
lies ontogénèse, the becoming of being. It is high time to
restore ontogenesis, the skeleton in the ontological cup-
board, to life. We will then see that every particular lifeThis content downloaded from 139.1
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms is both an open-ended exploration of the possibilities
of being our one world affords and a contribution to
its ongoing formation—to its worlding. It is, in this
sense, a never-ending quest for an answer to the problem
of what being human, or what living in this world, actu-
allymeans. But every answer is a response and not a so-
lution: a response that “provisionally integrates what was
formerly a source of tension” (Grosz 2012: 39). Respond-
ing to the question, we respond to one another; that is, we
correspond. And in this, we do not so much look out
from a position as long for one that is forever beyond
our grasp. Life is a question to which there is no answer,
but in this one world of ours we are all tasked with look-
ing for it, and it is in the search that all life is lived. And it
is just as well that there is no ﬁnal solution, for that, in-
deed, would put an end to us all.Acknowledgments
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